Principal can pass any role to compute it can launch
- Severity
- High
- Service
- IAM
- Check ID
- IAM_PASSROLE_WILDCARD_WITH_COMPUTE
What this check finds
A role or user is allowed iam:PassRole on every role (Resource "*", no condition) and at least one action that launches compute with a role (for example ec2:RunInstances, lambda:CreateFunction, ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition, sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob). Together they let it start something running as any role in the account, including an administrator role: privilege escalation in two calls.
Passing looks like: No principal can pass any role to compute it launches.
How to fix it
Scope iam:PassRole to the specific role ARNs the principal launches workloads with, and add a Condition on iam:PassedToService.
AWS console
IAM → Roles/Users → select principal → Permissions → edit the statement granting iam:PassRole.
Compliance controls it is evidence for
A failing result counts against these controls in KloudLytics; a passing one is evidence towards them. How compliance mapping works
| Framework | Controls |
|---|---|
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev5 (Moderate) |
|
| NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 |
|
| ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A |
|
Checked on every scan
KloudLytics runs this check each time it scans a connected AWS account, through a read-only role, and lists every affected resource with its region. On Pro and Business a fix is written for the specific resource rather than the general case above. The exact access it needs
More IAM checks
- HighDeprecated or flawed AWS managed policy in use
- HighIAM role allows assumption from anywhere
- HighIAM role with admin privileges can be assumed by unexpected principals
- HighIAM role with s3 listing and get privileges can be assumed by unexpected principals
- HighIAM user access key has not been rotated in over 180 days
- HighIncorrect policy used to attempt to enforce MFA
- HighInline policy allows privilege escalation to admin
- HighPrincipal has an attached policy granting administrative access