Principal has an attached policy granting administrative access
- Severity
- High
- Service
- IAM
- Check ID
- IAM_ATTACHED_ADMIN_POLICY
What this check finds
An IAM role, user, or group has AdministratorAccess (or another policy granting equivalent unrestricted access) attached directly. Any compromise of that principal is a full account compromise, and the blast radius cannot be contained after the fact.
Passing looks like: No principal with admin policy attached.
How to fix it
Detach the administrative policy and attach a scoped least-privilege policy instead. Reserve administrative access for a small number of break-glass roles that require MFA to assume.
AWS console
IAM → Roles/Users/Groups → select principal → Permissions → detach policy.
Compliance controls it is evidence for
A failing result counts against these controls in KloudLytics; a passing one is evidence towards them. How compliance mapping works
| Framework | Controls |
|---|---|
| CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark v5.0.0 |
|
| HIPAA Security Rule |
|
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev5 (Moderate) |
|
| NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 |
|
| ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A |
|
Checked on every scan
KloudLytics runs this check each time it scans a connected AWS account, through a read-only role, and lists every affected resource with its region. On Pro and Business a fix is written for the specific resource rather than the general case above. The exact access it needs
More IAM checks
- HighDeprecated or flawed AWS managed policy in use
- HighIAM role allows assumption from anywhere
- HighIAM role with admin privileges can be assumed by unexpected principals
- HighIAM role with s3 listing and get privileges can be assumed by unexpected principals
- HighIAM user access key has not been rotated in over 180 days
- HighIncorrect policy used to attempt to enforce MFA
- HighInline policy allows privilege escalation to admin
- MediumExpired SSL/TLS certificate stored in IAM